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Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1), clade 2.3.2.1a, 
with an H9-like polymerase basic protein 1 gene, isolated 
in Bhutan in 2012, replicated faster in vitro than its H5N1 
parental genotype and was transmitted more efficiently in a 
chicken model. These properties likely help limit/eradicate 
outbreaks, combined with strict control measures.
In India and Bangladesh, highly pathogenic avian influ-enza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses of the 2.3.2.1a genetic 
lineage have circulated in poultry since 2011 (1–3). Sub-
type H5N1 endemicity is complicated by co-circulating 
subtype H9N2, G1_Mideast lineage (4,5), which derives 
5 internal genes from HPAI A(H7N3) virus from Pakistan 
(4). A reassortant H5N1 2.3.2.1a virus, rH5N1, with an 
H9N2-like polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1) gene (H7N3 
origin), was reported in Bangladesh (2,5,6), India, and 
Nepal (7). However, its virulence and transmissibility 
are undetermined.
In Bhutan, the poultry sector consists of free-range back-
yard chickens, a rising number of commercial chicken farms, 
and domestic waterfowl in the south (8,9). Live-bird markets 
do not exist, but live birds are imported from India (8,9).
Bhutan’s poultry sector was severely affected by out-
breaks of HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 virus infection 
during 2012–2013 (10). Veterinary authorities enforced 
strict control measures, including depopulation of poul-
try in affected regions and burning of related housing and 
equipment (11). Illegal movement of poultry was the ma-
jor source of outbreaks (11). Although the introduction of 
HPAI A(H5N1) from neighboring H5N1-endemic coun-
tries is a constant threat, the subtype is not yet entrenched 
in poultry in Bhutan.
The Study
We isolated HPAI A(H5N1) viruses from samples from 36 
chickens and 9 wild birds in Bhutan, all from affected back-
yard farms adjacent to the highway connecting India with 
the capital, Thimphu (Figure 1; online Technical Appendix 
1 Table 1, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/22/12/16-
0611-Techapp1.pdf). Phylogenetic analysis (online Tech-
nical Appendix 1) suggested that the 2012–2013 outbreaks 
in Bhutan were caused by the rH5N1 genotype (2.3.2.1a/
H9-like PB1 [H7N3 origin]), reported in Bangladesh and 
India at that time (online Technical Appendix 1 Figures 
1, 2; other data not shown). PB1 phylogeny suggested 
that this genotype underwent 4 independent reassortment 
events on the Indian subcontinent (online Technical Ap-
pendix 1 Figure 2).
Antigenic analysis of selected H5N1 isolates from 
Bhutan (online Technical Appendix 1) showed homo-
geneity and a reactivity pattern similar to that of H5N1 
reference viruses from Bangladesh (Table). Amino acid 
differences were observed between strains A/chicken/
Bhutan/346/2012 (Ck/Bh/346) (rH5N1) and A/chicken/
Bangladesh/22478/2014 (Ck/BD/22478), representing the 
parental H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1a genotype (pH5N1) (online 
Technical Appendix 1 Table 2).
To assess whether the rH5N1-PB1 gene conferred a 
fitness advantage over the pH5N1 genotype, we exam-
ined replication kinetics in vitro (online Technical Ap-
pendix 1). The replication patterns of rH5N1 and pH5N1 
were similar in Madin-Darby canine kidney (mamma-
lian) cells (Figure 2, panel A). However, in chicken em-
bryo fibroblasts (CEFs), Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) titers were 
significantly higher than those of Dk/BD/21326 (rH5N1) 
(p<0.05) and Ck/BD/22478 (pH5N1) (p<0.01) at 12 
hours postinoculation (hpi) and those of Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) (p<0.001), and Dk/BD/19097 (pH5N1) (p<0.01) 
at 24 hpi. Dk/BD/21326 (rH5N1) had significantly higher 
titers than did Ck/BD/22478 (pH5N1) (p<0.01) at 24 hpi 
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DISPATCHES
(Figure 2, panel B). These results suggest rH5N1 viruses 
have a selective growth advantage in avian cells at early 
time points.
Next, we examined whether this growth advantage 
reflected higher pathogenicity or transmissibility for 
Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) in chickens than did Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) (online Technical Appendix 1). The 50% lethal 
dose (LD50) for chicken was 16 EID50 (50% egg infec-
tive dose) for Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) and 50 EID50 for Ck/
BD/22478 (pH5N1). After inoculation with 30 LD50 and 
cohousing with naive contacts, all donors shed virus oro-
pharyngeally and cloacally (Figure 2, panels C, D). All 
Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) donors died within 48 hpi, whereas 
only 50% of chickens inoculated with Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) died. Naive chickens in contact with donors 
inoculated with Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) or Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) became infected by day 2 after contact (Figure 
2, panel C), started shedding cloacally on day 3 (Figure 
2, panel D), and died by day 4. On day 3 after contact, 
Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) contacts had oropharyngeal and 
cloacal titers >1 log10 EID50/mL higher than those of Ck/
BD/22478 (pH5N1) contacts (Figure 2, panels C, D), but 
the difference was not significant.
We placed Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) and Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) in direct competition by co-housing chickens in-
oculated with each virus with naive contacts (online Tech-
nical Appendix 1). All donors shed virus oropharyngeally 
and cloacally, starting at 1 day postinoculation (dpi). By 
day 3 after contact, real-time reverse transcription PCR to 
detect PB1 (online Technical Appendix 1) revealed that 
7 of 8 naive contacts simultaneously exposed to both vi-
ruses were infected with Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) alone, none 
was infected with Ck/BD/22478 (pH5N1) alone, and 1 
was co-infected with both viruses. Thus, despite the low-
er infectious dose used for 30 LD50, Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) 
killed inoculated chickens faster than did Ck/BD/22478 
(pH5N1) and was transmitted faster and more efficiently 
to naive contacts.
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Figure 1. Locations of outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus, Bhutan, 2011–2013.
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We assessed the risk for human infection with 
rH5N1 by investigating its pathogenicity and transmis-
sibility in ferrets (online Technical Appendix 1). Do-
nors shed 4.5 log10 EID50/mL and 3.4 log10 EID50/mL in 
nasal wash samples at 2 dpi and 4 dpi, respectively, but 
cleared the virus by 6 dpi. No direct or aerosol contacts 
shed virus, suggesting that Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) was not 
transmitted (data not shown). No Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1)–in-
oculated ferrets lost >5% of their body weight or showed 
elevated body temperature (data not shown). Histopatho-
logic analysis showed that 1 donor, who was lethargic at 
3–10 dpi, had mild meningoencephalitis at 14 dpi (on-
line Technical Appendix 2, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/22/12/16-0611-Techapp2.pdf). A nucleocapsid 
protein–positive cell was detected in the brain, suggest-
ing that Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) is neurotropic. The other 
ferrets showed no clinical signs of disease. Virus replica-
tion was detected in the lung at 4 dpi (log10 2.75 EID50/g) 
(online Technical Appendix 2).
Conclusions
Our study revealed that the viruses that caused the 2012 
outbreaks in Bhutan belonged to the rH5N1 genotype 
(2.3.2.1a/H9-like PB1 [7:1]), whereas neither H9N2 nor 
the pH5N1 genotype have been detected there. rH5N1 has 
been isolated sporadically at live-bird markets and from 
chickens on farms where outbreaks occurred in Bangla-
desh (5,6), India (12), and Nepal (7) in 2011–2013. The 
lack of data on the effect of the H9-like PB1 gene on the 
virulence of rH5N1 makes determining its pathogenicity 
and transmissibility a critical public-health goal for Bhutan 
and neighboring countries.
Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) killed inoculated chickens 
faster than did Ck/BD/22478 (pH5N1), despite the low-
er infectious dose used for Ck/Bh/346. In CEFs, Ck/
Bh/346replicated with greater efficiency during the first 36 
hpi than did Ck/BD/22478, which possibly explains why 
rH5N1 transmits more efficiently to naive chickens when 
directly competing with pH5N1. How faster replication 
contributes to the increased mortality rate of naive chick-
ens might be crucial to eradicating the disease in Bhutan. 
In a mountainous region with widely separated villages, 
small-scale poultry farming, and no live-bird markets, the 
severity and rapid onset of the infection could lead to host-
resource exhaustion and self-limitation.
To determine whether the reassortant PB1 gene ac-
counts for the observed phenotypic properties of rH5N1, 
reverse genetics experiments are required. Despite its en-
hanced transmissibility, rH5N1 did not supplant pH5N1 
in India or Bangladesh after undergoing multiple reas-
sortment events. Possible reasons for this include the in-
volvement of other influenza subtypes, which would com-
plicate the competition/transmission model, especially at 
live-bird markets, as well as the large duck population, 
which is prone to inapparent HPAI infection (indicating 
possible underreporting).

























Reference antigens       
 A/BHG/QH/IA 2.2 320 40 40 80 40 
 A/Hubei/1/2010 2.3.2.1a 40 640 160 1280 80 
 A/ck/BD/15205 2.3.2.1a 10 80 80 320 40 
 A/dk/BD/19097 2.3.2.1a - 40 80 320 40 
 A/ck/Bhutan/346 2.3.2.1a 10 40 80 640 80 
Test antigens   
 A/chicken/Bhutan/257/2012 2.3.2.1a 20 40 40 640 40 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/260/2012 2.3.2.1a 20 40 80 640 80 
 A/wild bird/Bhutan/357/2012 2.3.2.1a 20 40 80 640 40 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/1026/2012 2.3.2.1a 40 40 80 1280 80 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/1030/2012 2.3.2.1a 80 160 320 1280 320 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/317/2012 2.3.2.1a 10 40 80 640 80 
 A/wild bird/Bhutan/326/2012 2.3.2.1a 10 80 40 320 20 
 A/wild bird/Bhutan/328/2012 2.3.2.1a 40 20 40 640 80 
 A/wild bird/Bhutan/356/2012 2.3.2.1a 40 160 160 640 80 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/406/2012 2.3.2.1a 20 40 80 320 80 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/413/2012 2.3.2.1a 20 40 80 640 40 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/505/2012 2.3.2.1a 80 40 80 640 80 
 A/chicken/Bhutan/933/2012 2.3.2.1a 40 40 80 640 80 










*Boldface indicates homologous titers. A/BHG/QH/IA, A/bar-headed goose/Qinghai/IA/2005; A/ck/BD/15205, A/chicken/Bangladesh/15205/2012; 
A/ck/Bhutan/346, A/chicken/Bhutan/346/2012; A/dk/BD/19097, A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013; GMT, geometric mean titer. 
†The immune response in ferrets was boosted with Freund’s incomplete adjuvant (InvivoGen, San Diego, CA, USA) at day 14 postinfection. 
 
DISPATCHES
Our ferret model results suggest that avian-to-human 
transmission of rH5N1 is possible. However, further adapta-
tion to the host is necessary for rH5N1 to become transmis-
sible among mammals. Similar results have been reported for 
H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1 (13), H5N1 clade 2.3.4 (14), and H5Nx 
clade 2.3.4.4 (15). rH5N1 is potentially neurotropic, mani-
festing clinically as mild meningoencephalitis with no obvi-
ous respiratory involvement. This finding has implications on 
early diagnosis and use of antiviral drugs during the first 48 
hours after clinical diagnosis for optimal therapeutic effect.
pH5N1 and H9N2 virus strains will likely continue to 
co-circulate on the Indian subcontinent, enabling further 
reassortment events. Our results highlight the need for ac-
tive surveillance and full-genome sequencing of all H5N1 
virus isolates.
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Figure 2. Pathogenesis of influenza virus rH5N1 and pH5N1 2.3.2.1a genotypes in vitro and in vivo. A) Replication kinetics of rH5N1 
and pH5N1 in Madin-Darby canine kidney (mammalian) cells. B) Replication kinetics of rH5N1 and pH5N1 in chicken embryonic 
fibroblast (avian) cells. C) Oropharyngeal shedding and transmissibility of rH5N1 and pH5N1 in a single-virus transmission model 
in 5-week-old White Leghorn chickens. D) Cloacal shedding and transmissibility of rH5N1 and pH5N1 in a single-virus transmission 
model in 5-week-old White Leghorn chickens. Naive chickens were co-housed with donors infected with either Ck/22478 (pH5N1) 
or Ck/Bh/346 (rH5N1) (C and D). The dashed line in each panel represents the limit of virus detection. ANOVA, analysis of variance; 
Ck/22478, A/chicken/Bangladesh/22478; Ck/Bh/346, A/chicken/Bhutan/346/2012; Dk/BD/23126, A/duck/Bangladesh/23126; Dk/
BD/19097/2013, A/duck/Bangladesh/19097; EID, egg infectious dose; dpi, days postinoculation; hpi, hours postinfection; pH5N1, 
pandemic H1N1; rH5N1, reassortant H5N1.
 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1), Bhutan
Dr. Marinova-Petkova was a postdoctoral research associate at 
St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, 
USA, while this research was conducted. She is now affiliated 
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, 
Georgia, USA, where her research interests include emerging 
influenza viruses at the animal–human interface, the evolution 
of influenza A viruses, and animal models for studying influenza 
pathogenesis and transmission.
References
  1. Nagarajan S, Tosh C, Smith DK, Peiris JSM, Murugkar HV,  
Sridevi R, et al. Avian influenza (H5N1) virus of clade 2.3.2  
in domestic poultry in India. PLoS ONE. 2012;7:e31844.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0031844
  2. Gerloff NA, Khan SU, Balish A, Shanta IS, Simpson N,  
Berman L, et al. Multiple reassortment events among highly  
pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses detected in  
Bangladesh. Virology. 2014;450–451:297–307.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.virol.2013.12.023
  3. Marinova-Petkova A, Feeroz MM, Rabiul Alam SM,  
Kamrul Hasan M, Akhtar S, Jones-Engel L, et al. Multiple  
introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1  
into Bangladesh. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2014;3:e11.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/emi.2014.11
  4. Shanmuganatham K, Feeroz MM, Jones-Engel L, Smith GJD, 
Fourment M, Walker D, et al. Antigenic and molecular  
characterization of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses,  
Bangladesh. Emerg Infect Dis. 2013;19. Epub 2013 Sep.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1909.130336
  5. Marinova-Petkova A, Shanmuganatham K, Feeroz MM,  
Jones-Engel L, Hasan MK, Akhtar S, et al. The continuing  
evolution of H5N1 and H9N2 influenza viruses in Bangladesh 
between 2013 and 2014. Avian Dis. 2016;60(Suppl):108–17.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1637/11136-050815-Reg
  6. Monne I, Yamage M, Dauphin G, Claes F, Ahmed G,  
Giasuddin M, et al. Reassortant avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses 
with H9N2–PB1 gene in poultry, Bangladesh. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2013;19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1910.130534
  7. Benson DA, Karsch-Mizrachi I, Lipman DJ, Ostell J,  
Wheeler DL. GenBank. Nucleic Acids Res. 2005;33:D34–8.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nar/gki063
  8. Nidup K, Tshering P. Status of the family poultry production and 
HPAI in Bhutan. In: Proceedings of the 8th Asian Pacific Poultry 
Conference of the World’s Poultry Science Association;  
Bangkok, Thailand; March 2007. p. 78–83 [cited 2016 Mar 8]. 
http://cms.cnr.edu.bt/cms/files/docs/File/Karma%20Nidup/Poultry/
FamilyPoultry&HPAIinBhutan.pdf
  9. Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of the Royal Government  
of Bhutan. Bhutan RNR statistics, 2015 [cited 2016 Mar 8].  
http://www.moaf.gov.bt/bhutan-rnr-statistics-2015-online/
10. World Organisation for Animal Health. Update on highly pathogenic  
avian influenza in animals (type H5 and H7). Immediate  
notification report, Bhutan. 2012 [cited 2016 Feb 8]. https://web.
oie.int/wahis/reports/en_imm_0000011465_20120110_120756.pdf
11. Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of Bhutan. RNR newsletter. 2013; 
I(3) [cited 2016 Feb 8]. http://www.moaf.gov.bt/rnr-newsletter-
september-2013/
12. Bhat S, Bhatia S, Pillai AS, Sood R, Singh VK, Shrivas OP, et al. 
Genetic and antigenic characterization of H5N1 viruses of clade 
2.3.2.1 isolated in India. Microb Pathog. 2015;88:87–93.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.micpath.2015.08.010
13. Xu L, Bao L, Yuan J, Li F, Lv Q, Deng W, et al. Antigenicity and 
transmissibility of a novel clade 2.3.2.1 avian influenza H5N1 virus. J 
Gen Virol. 2013;94:2616–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1099/vir.0.057778-0
14. Sun H, Pu J, Wei YD, Sun Y, Hu J, Liu L, et al. Highly pathogenic 
avian influenza H5N6 viruses exhibit enhanced affinity for human type 
sialic acid receptor and in-contact transmission in model ferrets. J Virol. 
2016. Epub 2016 Apr 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00127-16
15. Pulit-Penaloza JA, Sun X, Creager HM, Zeng H, Belser JA,  
Maines TR, et al. Pathogenesis and transmission of novel  
highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2 and H5N8 viruses  
in ferrets and mice. J Virol. 2015;89:10286–93.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/JVI.01438-15
Address for correspondence: Robert G. Webster, Department of 
Infectious Diseases, MS 330, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital,  
262 Danny Thomas Pl, Memphis, TN 38105-3678, USA; email:  
robert.webster@stjude.org
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 22, No. 12, December 2016 2141
®
World AIDS Day, December 1
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/page/world-aids
December 1 is World AIDS Day, an opportunity for people to work actively 
and collaboratively with partners around the world to raise awareness 
about HIV and help us move closer to the goal of an AIDS-free generation. 
